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Case Notes & Comments
A CHILL WIND BLOWS1: UNDUE BURDEN IN THE WAKE
OF WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH V. HELLERSTEDT
CATHERINE GAMPER
The Supreme Court’s latest addition to its abortion jurisprudence, Whole
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,2 contemplated a Texas abortion regulation
that required abortion providers throughout the state to meet certain
standards, including ambulatory surgical center standards and admitting
privileges requirements.3 The Court struck down the Texas law, grounding
its decision in its application of the undue burden test4: the regulations were
unconstitutional because they posed a substantial obstacle in the path of
women seeking abortions in Texas.5 The Court’s decision in Hellerstedt
indicates its commitment to the application of the undue burden test. As
states continue to enact abortion laws, however, the ever-evolving nature of
abortion jurisprudence remains unsettled.6

© 2017 Catherine Gamper.
1. This phrase references a quote from Justice Blackmun’s dissenting opinion in Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services. 492 U.S. 490, 560 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“For today, at
least, the law of abortion stands undisturbed. For today, the women of this Nation still retain the
liberty to control their destinies. But the signs are evident and very ominous, and a chill wind
blows.”).

J.D. Candidate, 2018, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The author
thanks her editors, Michael Collins, Michael LaBattaglia, Alexandra Jabs, and Hannah Cole-Chu
for their valuable and unremitting assistance throughout the writing process. The author also wishes
to thank Professor Rena Steinzor, Professor Leslie Meltzer Henry, and the author’s family for their
unwavering support and guidance. The author dedicates this Comment to her late mother, Maria
Rixey Gamper, whose unconditional love made everything possible.
2. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
3. Id.; see infra Part I.B.
4. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2300; see infra Part I.A.3 (explaining the origin of the undue
burden test). A law imposes an undue burden on a woman seeking an abortion if the law has the
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a
non-viable fetus. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
5. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2300; see infra Part I.B.
6. As of July 21, 2016, thirty-two states attempted to ban all or some abortions in 2016 and
fourteen states enacted other abortion regulations such as waiting periods, restrictions on medication
abortion, and regulations on abortion clinics. ELIZABETH NASH ET AL., GUTTMACHER INST. LAWS
AFFECTING REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AND RIGHTS: STATE TRENDS AT MIDYEAR, 2016 (2016),
https://www.guttmacher.org/article/2016/07/laws-affecting-reproductive-health-and-rights-statetrends-midyear-2016.
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This Comment will first examine the trends underlying both the
Supreme Court’s and several federal district courts’ analyses of the undue
burden test. The Court’s review of abortion regulations has evolved from
Roe v. Wade’s7 landmark holding that abortion was a fundamental right to
the introduction of the undue burden test as the constitutional standard of
review of statutes regulating abortion.8 This Comment will then demonstrate
that the Court’s abortion jurisprudence is at an inflection point. With the
advent of a Trump presidency, and the likelihood of two Trump appointees
to the Court, the undue burden standard remains subject to change.
This Comment will argue that, as the Court sits today, abortion
regulations are analyzed through a dual framework. Those laws that regulate
an individual’s access to abortions will likely survive the undue burden test
while those laws that restrict an abortion provider’s provision of abortions
will likely fail.9 The effect of the Court’s current abortion jurisprudence,
however, leaves open an avenue for states to fashion novel and creative
approaches to regulate abortion that fall somewhere between regulating an
individual’s access to and a doctor’s provision of abortions.10 Abortion
providers in states seeking to enact such laws must anticipate and plan for
such regulations or face clinic closures. Likewise, women in those states may
face greater challenges to obtaining abortions in their home states if the
providers cannot keep up with their legislature’s continuing efforts at
regulation, which reduces access to the procedure.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Origin of Abortion as a Fundamental Right: From Roe to
Casey
The scope of a woman’s right to an abortion has shifted significantly
since the mid-twentieth century, from a privacy right to a reproductive
autonomy right to a quasi-fundamental right. The Court first established
early contraceptive rights in Griswold v. Connecticut,11 securing a person’s
right to obtain contraception because it was included within the broader right
to marital privacy.12 This Section first describes how the Court grappled with
the constitutional source of the contraceptive right, ultimately deciding that

7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
8. See infra Part I.A.3.
9. See infra Part II. A law that survives the undue burden test means that a court finds it
constitutional whereas a law that fails the undue burden test renders it unconstitutional. See infra
Part II.
10. See infra Part II.C.
11. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
12. Id. at 486.
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strict scrutiny applies to laws regulating access to contraceptives.13 Next, this
Section discusses the well-known decision Roe v. Wade, which established
the fundamental right to abortion and created the trimester framework to
determine which level of review to apply to abortion regulations.14 Finally,
this Section focuses on the status of abortion laws after Roe, as states
continued to enact laws restricting access to abortion.15 The Court ultimately
replaced the trimester framework with the undue burden test, which the Court
continues to apply today.16
1. The Right to Abortion Was First Grounded in an Individual’s
Right to Privacy and Shifted to One Grounded in an Individual’s
Right to Reproductive Autonomy
The foundation of the legal right to abortion grew out of the Supreme
Court’s examination of early contraceptive rights, specifically a married
couple’s right to determine when and whether to have children without
intrusion from the state. In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court established a
married couple’s right to use contraceptives based on their fundamental right
to marital privacy grounded in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.17 In that case, the Court struck down a state law prohibiting
married couples’ use of contraception based on the privacy right’s
“recognition” as a “penumbral right[].”18 The majority did not articulate a
standard of review, but rather indicated that because the right to marital
privacy was part of the penumbral privacy rights—such as those inherent in
the First Amendment, Third Amendment, and Fourth Amendment—the
marital privacy right was also a fundamental right.19 In his concurring
opinion, Justice Harlan called for strict scrutiny review of laws affecting the
right to privacy, which he argued was protected under the liberty prong of the
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process clause.20 In dissent, Justice
Black warned of the implications of establishing a fundamental right not
enumerated in the Constitution.21 Finding a fundamental right to privacy, he
argued, was akin to the often-stigmatized decision in Lochner v. New York,22
in which the Court found a fundamental right to contract under the liberty
13. See infra Part I.A.1.
14. See infra Part I.A.2.
15. See infra Part I.A.3.
16. See infra Part I.A.3.
17. 381 U.S. 479 (1965); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment forbids states
from depriving any person of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Id.
18. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
19. Id. at 483–85.
20. Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring).
21. Id. at 520–22 (Black, J., dissenting).
22. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).

2017]

A CHILL WIND BLOWS

795

prong of the Fourteenth Amendment.23 Black argued that the decision in
Lochner to “liberally use[]” the Due Process Clause to strike down economic
legislation was a finding that “threaten[ed] . . . the tranquility and stability of
the Nation” and was “laid . . . to rest once and for all” when Lochner was
overruled.24 With this split between Justices who found the privacy right
fundamental on the one hand and, on the other hand, those who rejected the
notion that the Constitution protected the right to privacy, the future of the
marital right to privacy endured on rudimentary grounds.
The Court then shifted its view on the constitutional source of
contraceptives from one of privacy to one of reproductive autonomy.25 In a
challenge to a statute prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to unmarried
couples, the Court struck down the statute on equal protection grounds in
Eisenstadt v. Baird.26 The Court found that a Massachusetts law prohibiting
contraceptives to unmarried couples was unconstitutional under rational
basis review.27 Even though the Court did not apply strict scrutiny,28 this
decision demonstrated that the Court would treat the right to reproductive
autonomy, or “the decision whether to bear or beget a child,” as fundamental
and laws prohibiting such reproductive autonomy would fail under rational
basis review.29 The Court ultimately determined that strict scrutiny should
be applied to laws regulating contraceptives in Carey v. Population Services
International.30 Striking down a New York statute which prohibited anyone
but a licensed physician from distributing contraceptives, the Court reasoned
that a state cannot interfere with an individual’s right to make decisions in
matters of child-bearing.31
2. Roe Established Abortion as a Fundamental Right
The Court established abortion in the first trimester as a fundamental
right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in Roe v.

23. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 522.
24. Id. (citations omitted) (citing W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); and then
citing Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. W. Reference & Bond Ass’n, 313 U.S. 236 (1941)).
25. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
26. Id. at 454–55.
27. Id. at 443–45. Rational basis review requires a law to be rationally related to a legitimate
state interest. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
28. Strict scrutiny requires a law to be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). As discussed in Part I.A.3, since Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, laws regulating abortion are not subject to rational basis nor
strict scrutiny, but rather to the undue burden test. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
29. Id. at 453 (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905)).
30. 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977).
31. Id. at 688–89.
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Wade.32 The Court grounded the decision in its creation of a trimester
framework for determining when the state has a legitimate interest in
regulating abortion.33 Based on the substantive due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion found a
fundamental right to terminate a pregnancy during the first trimester of
pregnancy.34 During the first trimester, the state did not have a compelling
interest to prohibit abortion.35 During the second trimester, the state could
regulate abortion to protect the woman’s health, but the state could not
regulate to protect the fetus until viability.36 During the third trimester, when
viability was expected, the state could regulate or prohibit abortion except
when the life or health of the woman was at stake.37 In dissent, Justice
Rehnquist argued that because abortion is a medical procedure, the state had
an interest in regulating it just like any other medical procedure and,
therefore, the Court should have deferred to the states.38
The right to abortion remained a fundamental right for over twenty
years, during which time the Court consistently struck down state attempts to
regulate or prohibit the procedure. The Court considered cases involving
state statutes that required second trimester abortions to be performed in a
hospital, prohibited a doctor from performing an abortion until twenty-four
hours after the pregnant woman signed a consent form, and required prior
written consent from a woman’s spouse.39 The Court struck down these
regulations under the trimester framework established in Roe.40 In a handful
of cases involving a minor’s access to abortion, however, the Court upheld
statutes that required parental consent.41
32. 410 U.S. at 155–56, 164–65.
33. Id. at 164–66.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 163–64 (“With respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest in potential
life, the ‘compelling’ point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably has the
capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb.”).
36. Id. (“With respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest in the health of the
mother, the ‘compelling’ point, in the light of present medical knowledge, is at approximately the
end of the first trimester.”).
37. Id. at 164–65.
38. Id. at 172–73 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
39. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (finding
informed consent requirements unconstitutional); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health,
462 U.S. 416 (1983) (finding twenty-four hour waiting period requirement and hospital requirement
unconstitutional); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (finding spousal consent
requirement unconstitutional).
40. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 759–71; Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. at 430–31;
Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67–72.
41. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). In Bellotti,
the Court upheld a minor consent requirement because “the constitutional rights of children cannot
be equated with those of adults” based on their “peculiar vulnerability” and “their inability to make
critical decisions in an informed, mature manner.” Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634.
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Abortion Is No Longer a Fundamental Right After Casey
Discarded the Trimester Framework and Created the Undue
Burden Test

The Court ultimately discarded the trimester framework in Planned
Parenthood of Southeast Pennsylvania v. Casey42 and instituted the undue
burden test, which analyzes the purpose of and burdens imposed by abortion
regulations.43 Before Casey was decided, however, the Court first considered
reformulating the trimester framework in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services,44 a case that challenged the status of the definition of viability relied
on in Roe.45 Failing to muster a majority vote to overrule Roe, Justice
Blackmun warned that Roe’s decision would be eroded through state
legislative initiatives that would enact increasingly restrictive abortion laws
as “test cases” to challenge Roe’s framework.46
The reformulation of the trimester framework that began in Webster was
completed in Casey. The Casey Court changed the language of the abortion
debate when, writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor explained that a state
regulation will impose an undue burden on a woman seeking an abortion if it
has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion of a non-viable fetus.47 In dissent, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, joined by Justices Thomas and White, opined that the majority
had significantly altered Roe’s meaning, that the right to abortion was no
longer fundamental, and that the new test will serve only to complicate the
abortion debate.48 The Court ultimately struck down only one provision of
the law at issue as imposing an undue burden: the spousal notification
requirement.49
The Court first applied the undue burden test in Stenberg v. Carhart,50
when it considered the constitutionality of a Nebraska statute banning partial-

42. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
43. Id. at 870.
44. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
45. Id. at 501, 518. The Webster Court explained:
The key elements of the Roe framework—trimesters and viability—are not found in the
text of the Constitution or in any place else one would expect to find a constitutional
principle. Since the bounds of the inquiry are essentially indeterminate, the result has
been a web of legal rules that have become increasingly intricate, resembling a code of
regulations rather than a body of constitutional doctrine.
Id. at 518.
46. Id. at 538.
47. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
48. Id. at 944 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 898 (majority opinion) (“A State may not give to a man the kind of dominion over
his wife that parents exercise over their children.”).
50. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
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birth abortions.51 Justice Breyer found the statute unconstitutional because it
posed an undue burden on women by failing to provide a health exception
for the mother and because its language could be read to prohibit common
pre-viability procedures.52 The Court applied the undue burden test for a
second time in Gonzales v. Carhart,53 but upheld the challenged ban on
partial-birth abortions.54 The decision came following the retirement of
Justice O’Connor and the appointment of Justice Alito, and concerned a
statute that banned the practice of partial-birth abortions, even in cases where
the health of the mother was at stake.55 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion
applied rational basis review to the partial-birth abortion ban and ultimately
deferred to legislative findings on the procedure, such as its gruesome nature
and threat to the dignity of the medical profession.56 Justice Ginsburg’s
dissent decried the majority’s neglect of the need to make medical decisions
on a case-by-case basis, and failure to favor a woman’s health in situations
where a partial-birth abortion may be medically advised.57
B. The Hellerstedt Decision
In 2013, the Texas legislature passed House Bill 2 (“H.B. 2”),58 which,
among other provisions, required that all abortion providers have active
admitting privileges at a hospital no further than thirty miles from the
abortion provider’s location (“the admitting privileges requirement”).59 The
bill also mandated that abortion centers meet the minimum standards adopted
by ambulatory surgical centers (“the surgical center requirement”).60 The
legislature’s stated purpose of the bill was to “raise the standard and quality
51. Id. at 920–22. Partial-birth abortions or “intact dilation and evacuation (D&X)” or “D&E”
involves deliberate dilation of the cervix and removal of the fetus from the cervix either intact in
one pass by partially evacuating the intracranial contents of the living fetus (collapsing the fetus’
skull) so that the skull may pass through the cervix. Id. at 926–29. At the time of decision, there
was no reliable reporting on the number of D&X abortions performed annually, but estimates ranged
between 640 and 5,000 per year. Id. at 929.
52. Id. at 930.
53. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
54. Id. at 132–33.
55. Id. at 141. The partial-birth abortion ban allowed an exception for cases where the
woman’s life was at stake. Id.
56. Id. at 156–58.
57. Id. at 170–71 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
58. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 171.0031, 245.010(a) (West Supp. 2016).
59. Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 677 (W.D. Tex. 2014), vacated sub
nom. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 833 F.3d 565 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing HEALTH &
SAFETY § 171.0031(a)(1); 25 ADMIN. CODE §§ 139.53(c), .56(a)).
60. Id. (citing HEALTH & SAFETY §§ 245.010(a), 243.010; 25 ADMIN. CODE § 139.40). The
bill also included a medication abortion provision. HEALTH & SAFETY § 171.0061. A discussion
of medication abortions is beyond the scope of this Comment, as this Comment focuses only on
surgical abortions.
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of care for women seeking abortions and to protect the health and welfare of
women seeking abortions.”61 Abortion clinics had to comply with the
admitting privileges requirement beginning on October 31, 2013.62 Abortion
clinics, however, had roughly fourteen months after enactment of the bill
(September 2014) to meet the standards of the surgical center requirement.63
This Section first addresses the initial challenges to the bill, which were
largely unsuccessful and created various preemptive issues for later abortion
providers challenging the bill. 64 This Section then traces and focuses on the
procedural posture of the second challenge to the bill.65 Finally, this Section
outlines the Court’s reasoning and analysis of the current undue burden
standard in the abortion context.66
1. Initial Challenges to H.B. 2: Abbott I and Abbott II
Shortly after enactment of H.B. 2, several abortion providers filed suit
in the Western District of Texas, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
from the admitting privileges requirement of the bill.67 The court granted
injunctive relief to the abortion providers.68 Three days later, the Fifth Circuit
vacated the district court’s injunction, allowing the admitting privileges
requirement to take effect.69 Several months later, the Fifth Circuit issued an
opinion reversing in part and affirming in part the district court’s decision.70
The plaintiffs did not challenge the surgical center provision and they did not
seek certiorari from the Supreme Court.71
61. Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 576 (5th Cir. 2015), modified, 790 F.3d
598 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S.
Ct. 2292 (2016) (citing SENATE COMM. ON HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., BILL ANALYSIS, TEX. H.B.
2, 83d Leg., 2d C.S., at 1 (2013)).
62. Id. at 576 n.12.
63. Id. at 576–77. The surgical center standards fall into three categories of regulation: first,
“operating requirements” such as record keeping systems, staffing, and cleanliness, 25 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE §§ 135.4 to .17, 135.26 to .27, second, “fire prevention and general safety requirements,” id.
§§ 135.41 to .43, and third, “physical plant and construction requirements” such as electrical, and
plumbing, id. §§ 135.51 to .56.
64. See infra Part I.B.1.
65. See infra Part I.B.2.
66. See infra Part I.B.3.
67. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 951 F. Supp. 2d 891,
909 (W.D. Tex. 2013), rev’d in part, 748 F.3d 583 (5th Cir. 2014). Plaintiffs also sought relief from
the medication abortion provision of the bill. Id.
68. Id.
69. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott (Abbott I), 734 F.3d
406, 419 (5th Cir. 2013).
70. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott (Abbott II), 748 F.3d
583, 605 (5th Cir. 2014).
71. Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 577 (5th Cir. 2015), modified, 790 F.3d
598 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S.
Ct. 2292 (2016).
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2. Procedural Posture
In April 2014, a group of abortion providers, some of whom were also
plaintiffs in the Abbott cases, filed suit in the Western District of Texas
seeking to enjoin the admitting privileges requirement on physicians at two
abortion facilities and the surgical center requirement.72 The plaintiffs
claimed that the two provisions violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution as interpreted in Casey.73 After a bench trial, the district court
granted the plaintiffs injunctive relief, finding sufficient evidence that the two
provisions were unconstitutional because the act, operating as a whole,
placed an “impermissible obstacle” on women seeking pre-viability
abortions.74
Relying on the Court’s decisions in Roe and Casey, the district court
placed considerable weight on the stipulated facts of the case.75 The court
highlighted the low number of abortion facilities (eight) that would exist in
Texas if the surgical center requirement went into effect, as well as statistics
showing that 60,000 to 72,000 legal abortions are performed annually in
Texas, the second highest rate in the United States.76 Additionally, the court
found that once the surgical center requirement went into effect, two million
women would live farther than fifty miles from a legal abortion provider.77
Arguing that “Roe’s essential holding guarantee[d that] all women, not just
those of means, [have] the right to a previability abortion,” and distinguishing
the regulations at issue in Casey,78 the court found that the two provisions at
issue “erect[ed] a particularly high barrier for poor, rural, or disadvantaged
women throughout Texas, regardless of the absolute distance they may have
to travel to obtain an abortion.”79 Accordingly, the court found that the act
as a whole created obstacles to pre-viability abortion and the “severity of the
burden imposed by both requirements [was] not balanced by the weight of
the interests underlying them.”80

72. Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673 (W.D. Tex. 2014), aff’d in part,
vacated in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d (5th Cir. 2015),
modified, 790 F.3d 598 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Whole Woman’s Health v.
Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
73. Id. at 687.
74. Id. at 687–88.
75. Id. at 680–82.
76. Id. at 681.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 683–84 (contrasting the statutes at issue in Casey with the act at issue in Lakey by
arguing that the challenged requirements in Lakey “are solely targeted at regulating the performance
of abortions, not the decision to seek an abortion,” as was the case in Casey).
79. Id. at 683.
80. Id. at 684.
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The Fifth Circuit stayed the district court’s injunction, but the providers
appealed to the Supreme Court.81 The Supreme Court vacated the Fifth
Circuit’s stay, which reinstated the district court’s injunction.82 Back before
the Fifth Circuit, that court found both provisions of the law to be
constitutional.83 Despite the fact that the Fifth Circuit found that res judicata
barred plaintiffs from bringing the suit, the court addressed the merits of the
case, finding that the district court erred in concluding that the statutes were
unconstitutional.84 Under rational basis review, the Fifth Circuit found that
both provisions were rationally related to the legitimate state interest of
ensuring the health and safety of women seeking pre-viability abortions.85
Further, the court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the
legislature had an improper purpose in passing the law and also failed to
prove that the surgical center requirement imposed an undue burden on a
large fraction of women for whom it is relevant.86 Regarding the as-applied
challenges, the challenge to the surgical center requirement as applied to the
Whole Woman’s Health clinic in McAllen, Texas, and the challenge to the
admitting privileges requirement as applied to a specific doctor, Dr. Lynn,
when working at the McAllen clinic, the court affirmed the district court’s
injunction.87 The court reasoned that the factual contexts of those challenges
were not yet developed when the Abbott decisions were handed down.88 The
abortion providers sought certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted.89
3. The Hellerstedt Court’s Reasoning
The Court held that the Texas law posed an undue burden on a woman’s
right to obtain a pre-viability abortion. First finding that the claims brought
by petitioners were not precluded by res judicata, the Court proceeded to the
merits of the case, grounding its undue burden analysis in three Supreme
Court decisions90 on abortion.91 On the issue of claim preclusion, the Court
argued that the claims were significantly different from those raised in the

81. Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 567 n.3 (5th Cir. 2015), modified, 790 F.3d
598 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S.
Ct. 2292 (2016).
82. Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 135 S. Ct. 399 (2014) (mem).
83. Cole, 790 F.3d at 567.
84. Id. at 583–84, 598.
85. Id. at 585–86.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 592–98.
89. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
90. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
91. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2300.
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Abbott cases because they arose from a set of facts developed subsequent to
the enforcement of the admitting privileges requirement, and which were
“unknowable” prior to enforcement of the law.92 Further, the two provisions
had “meaningful differences” with different enforcement dates, and although
they are part of one overall regulatory scheme, courts should still treat
challenges to each provision as “separate claims.”93 Writing for the majority,
Justice Breyer argued that both the admitting privileges and the surgical
center requirements imposed an undue burden on a woman’s right to a previability abortion, given the “virtual absence of any health benefit” of the two
provisions.94
Regarding the admitting privileges requirement, the Court reasoned that
the purpose of the requirement was to ensure that women have easy access to
a hospital in the event complications arise during an abortion procedure.95
The Court, however, relying on the studies and expert testimony on abortion
complications considered by the district court, emphasized the district court’s
finding that the law brought about no such health-related benefit.96
Considering the surgical center requirement, the Court found that the
requirement was not based on any differences between abortion procedures
or other similar surgical procedures related to preserving women’s health.97
Rather, the requirements such as mandating scrub facilities, having a oneway traffic pattern, and requiring safeguards for heavily sedated patients are
both inappropriate and unnecessary because abortions are not performed
under general anesthesia or deep sedation.98 Finally, the Court argued that
the high costs of instituting the surgical center standards would result in
clinics closing, which would neither ensure better care nor increase the
frequency of better outcomes because the current clinics could have to serve
five times their usual number of patients.99 In a concurring opinion, Justice
Ginsburg criticized the Court’s judicial review of any “laws like H.B. 2 that
‘do little or nothing for health, but rather strew impediments to abortion’”
and warned that such laws “cannot survive judicial inspection.”100

92. Id. at 2306–07.
93. Id. at 2308 (quoting 18 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4408 (2d ed. 2002, Supp. 2015)).
94. Id. at 2311–19.
95. Id. at 2311 (citing Brief for Respondents at 32–37, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,
136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (No. 15-0274)).
96. Id. at 2312–13.
97. Id. at 2315.
98. Id. at 2315–16.
99. Id. at 2317–18.
100. Id. at 2320–21 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v.
Schimel, 806 F.3d 908, 921 (7th Cir. 2015)).
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In his dissent, Justice Thomas argued that the majority failed to apply
the correct standard of review to the law at issue.101 Arguing that the majority
“rewrote” the undue burden test espoused in Casey in such a way that it
makes the test “much more akin to strict scrutiny,” Justice Thomas
highlighted three reasons why the majority erred in its application of the
test.102 First, he argued that the balancing test used by the majority was not
in line with the undue burden test in Casey because Casey did not weigh the
benefits and burdens of the spousal notification law it considered. Rather,
Casey focused on the likelihood that the law would prevent women from
obtaining an abortion.103 Second, he argued that the majority did not respect
the legislature’s judgment in this situation that involved a medical
uncertainty.104 Finally, he argued, “the majority overrule[d] another central
aspect of Casey by” instituting a higher standard than rational basis for
abortion laws, “even if they do not substantially impede access to
abortion.”105
Justice Alito authored a separate dissent joined by Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Thomas in which he argued that the Abbott II decision precluded
the petitioners from bringing suit in Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey.106
Finding that the two claims were part of the very same transaction (the
enactment of the two requirements), and that “new and better evidence” does
not give a plaintiff a new claim on the same set of operative facts, the dissent
reasoned that issue preclusion barred petitioners from bringing the suit in the
first place.107 Justice Alito argued further that even if res judicata did not
apply to the claims, the Texas law was nonetheless constitutional because
petitioners failed to show that the law posed an undue burden on women
seeking pre-viability abortions.108 Highlighting that what matters is not the
law’s effect on the petitioners as abortion providers, but rather the effect on
patients, the dissent found the petitioners failed to show that the provisions
had “an unconstitutional impact on at least a ‘large fraction’ of Texas women
of reproductive age.”109
In summation, while the abortion right was deemed fundamental in Roe
because it derived from a woman’s right to privacy and reproductive

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 2324 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 893 (1992)).
Id. at 2325.
Id.
Id. at 2330 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2339–40.
Id. at 2342–43.
Id. at 2343 (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167–68 (2007)).
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autonomy,110 the abortion right is no longer fundamental.111 Instead, the
Court grants that the state has a legitimate interest in regulating abortion in
certain instances,112 such as the use of partial-birth abortions or requiring
informed parental consent for a minor’s abortion. The Court, however,
requires that an abortion regulation not create an undue burden for a woman
seeking an abortion.113 The Court has found that regulations that pose an
undue burden include spousal notification requirements, admitting privileges
requirements, and ambulatory surgical center requirements.114
II. ANALYSIS
In the wake of the Hellerstedt decision, state laws aiming to regulate
abortion are in a precarious position. This is because, as a result of the
holding, future application of the undue burden test remains unclear. The
Court currently reviews abortion regulations through a dual framework.
First, it tends to uphold abortion regulations that relate to women’s safety and
wellbeing on an individual basis, such as parental consent and waiting
periods.115 Second, it tends to strike down abortion regulations that are aimed
at regulating the institutional implementation and accessibility of abortion,
such as the ambulatory surgical center and admitting privileges requirements
in Hellerstedt.116 Additionally, the Court is more likely to find an undue
burden in a law that regulates an aspect of the broader institutional provision
of abortion, but it is not as likely to find an undue burden in a law that
regulates an individual’s access to abortion.117
The difference between provision and access is a subtle one, but the dual
framework represents the Court’s refusal to treat abortion as a fundamental
right and instead as a right that can be regulated by states so long as the right
is not substantially burdened.118 If the dual framework trend continues, the
future of the abortion right will remain “trapped”119 between states continuing

110. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
111. See supra Part I.A.
112. See supra Part I.A.
113. See supra Part I.A.
114. See supra Part II.B.
115. See infra Part II.A.
116. See infra Part II.B.
117. See infra Parts II.A–B.
118. See infra Parts II.A–B.
119. “Trapped” is the name of a 2016 documentary produced and directed by Dawn Porter,
which highlights the “TRAP” (“Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers”) laws in several
southern states, including Texas, Alabama, and Louisiana. TRAPPED (Trilogy Films 2016). The
documentary provided key insight for this Comment into the professional lives of abortion
providers, physicians, nurses and administrators and the day-to-day impact of abortion laws in their
clinics. Id.
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to fashion new and creative laws regulating abortion on the one hand, and
courts aiming to make sense of the undue burden standard on the other.120
Gauging the current Court’s approach to abortion regulations is twofold. First, one must determine what type of abortion regulation is at issue:
an individual-based regulation or an institutional-based regulation. Second,
a court should evaluate the overall impact of the regulation on a woman’s
access to abortion, weighing the burden of the regulation on a woman seeking
abortion against the benefit it aims to achieve for that same woman. This Part
first discusses the individual-based abortion laws that are consistently upheld
by the Court.121 Next, this Part examines the institutional-based regulations
and their failure to pass the undue burden test as espoused in Hellerstedt.122
Finally, this Part explores possible policy consequences of the undue burden
standard after Hellerstedt.123
A. The Court Upholds Laws Regulating Access to Abortions on
Individual Basis
Casey’s undue burden standard peeled away the layer of fundamental
right protection from the right to abortion, making it possible for states to
pass more restrictive laws regulating an individual’s access to abortion.
Several federal appellate courts have found laws that require counseling,
twenty-four- to forty-eight-hour waiting periods, or parental consent
requirements, do not impose an undue burden on women seeking
abortions.124 In applying the undue burden standard, for example, the Court
in Casey upheld Pennsylvania’s informed consent, twenty-four-hour waiting
period, and parental consent laws.125 The Casey Court reasoned that while a
woman has a right to an abortion before viability, states are not prohibited
from “taking steps to ensure that this choice is thoughtful and informed” and
“[s]tates are free to enact laws to provide a reasonable framework for a
woman to make a decision that has such profound and lasting meaning.”126
Therefore, the Court found that regulations such as requiring a woman to wait
twenty-four hours between the provision of informed consent information

120. See infra Part II.C.
121. See infra Part II.A.
122. See infra Part II.B.
123. See infra Part II.C.
124. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Minn., N. Dakota, S. Dakota v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889 (8th
Cir. 2012) (finding constitutional a Minnesota law requiring disclosures of the increased risk of
suicide to women seeking abortions); Cincinnati Women’s Servs. v. Taft, 468 F.3d 361 (6th Cir.
2006) (finding constitutional an Ohio law requiring a twenty-four-hour waiting period prior to an
abortion procedure); Manning v. Hunt, 119 F.3d 254 (4th Cir. 1997) (upholding a North Carolina
statute requiring parental or judicial consent for a minor’s abortion).
125. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 880, 887, 899 (1992).
126. Id. at 872–73.
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and the performance of the abortion did not create an undue burden.127
Although such regulations may pose “particularly burdensome” financial and
travel restrictions on women, the twenty-four-hour waiting periods were not
substantial obstacles to women seeking abortions.128 The Court does not
ignore the fact that such regulations may make it harder for women to access
abortions.129 The Court did not find, however, that such obstacles left women
with no realistic choice.130
Casey enabled states to increase the barriers to an individual’s decision
to have an abortion. States continue to enact laws that institute mandatory
waiting periods, informed consent procedures, and parental involvement
regulations, and these laws are considered constitutional because the
restrictions they place do not amount to an undue burden on the individual’s
choice to procure an abortion. For example, the Guttmacher Institute
reported that as of January 1, 2017, thirty-five states require counseling
before an abortion, twenty-seven of which also require waiting periods
(usually twenty-four hours), and thirty-seven states require some type of
parental involvement in a minor’s decision to have an abortion.131 Further,
twenty-nine of the thirty-five states that require counseling also require that
providers give specific information to women seeking abortions, fourteen
states require that clinics provide in-person counseling before the waiting
period begins, and three states mandate that an abortion provider perform an
ultrasound on a woman seeking an abortion.132
Casey is instructive in these situations, because there the Court made
clear that even if “a law which serves a valid purpose, one not designed to
strike at the right itself, has the incidental effect of making it more difficult
or more expensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate
it.”133 Likewise, though waiting period and informed consent laws may delay
127. Id. at 886–87.
128. Id. at 886.
129. Id. at 877–78.
130. See id. (“Regulations which do no more than create a structural mechanism by which the
State, or the parent or guardian of a minor, may express profound respect for the life of the unborn
are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman’s exercise of the right to choose.”).
131. Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST.,
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/counseling-and-waiting-periods-abortion
(last
updated Jan. 1, 2017); Parental Involvement in Minors’ Abortions, GUTTMACHER INST.,
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/parental-involvement-minors-abortions
(last
updated Jan. 1, 2017). The Guttmacher Institute is a “research and policy organization committed
to advancing sexual and reproductive health and rights in the United States and globally.” About
Us, GUTTMACHER INST., https://www.guttmacher.org/about (last visited Apr. 2, 2017). All data is
as of January 1, 2017.
132. Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, supra note 131; Requirements for
Ultrasound, GUTTMACHER INST., https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/requirementsultrasound (last updated Jan. 1, 2017).
133. Casey, 505 U.S. at 874.
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the abortion procedure, the effect on individuals exercising their choice to
obtain an abortion, without more, is not substantial enough to invalidate
them.134 In a study conducted by the Guttmacher Institute in 2014,
researchers found that seventy-six percent of patients could obtain abortions
within seven days of making the appointment.135 Further, fifty-four percent
of these women lived in a state without a waiting period, twenty-four percent
lived in a state with a waiting period that required in-person counseling, and
twenty-two percent lived in a state with a waiting period but no required inperson counseling.136 On an individual basis, women who face obstacles,
such as having to wait twenty-four hours before the abortion, are still able to
access the abortion clinics and providers, thereby not unduly restricting their
right to choose an abortion.
B. The Court Finds That Laws Regulating Institutional Aspects of the
Provision of Abortion Impose an Undue Burden
Hellerstedt represents the Court’s most recent analysis and application
of the undue burden standard, and highlights the Court’s unwillingness to
uphold state laws that require providers to meet standards that it views as
unrealistic, difficult to implement, or result in closing abortion clinics
statewide. The Hellerstedt Court found the Texas admitting privileges and
ambulatory surgical center requirements imposed an undue burden on
women in the state because, once the law went into effect, only about seven
or eight abortion clinics in the state could remain open.137 These remaining
clinics would not be able to meet the demand for abortion in the State of
Texas, where 60,000 to 72,000 women seek abortions every year.138 The
Court emphasized the drastic effect such laws would have on abortion clinics
and their consequent failure to adequately meet the demonstrated demand of
Texas women for abortions.139 If the Texas law were to go into effect, women
seeking abortions in Texas would have to “travel long distances to get
abortions in crammed-to-capacity superfacilities” and such facilities,
“attempting to accommodate sudden, vastly increased demand, may find that

134. See id. (“Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman’s ability to
make this decision does the power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause.”).
135. RACHEL K. JONES & JENNA JERMAN, GUTTMACHER INST., TIME TO APPOINTMENT AND
DELAYS IN ACCESSING CARE AMONG U.S. ABORTION PATIENTS 1 (2016).
136. Id.
137. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2316 (2016).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 2318.
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quality of care declines.”140 Contrary to laws requiring women be fully
informed and wait twenty-four hours before proceeding with their choice to
have an abortion, the laws struck down in Hellerstedt created an undue
burden on women. The Court found the obstacles so substantial to women
seeking an abortion in Texas that the laws could be seen as eliminating the
woman’s ability to choose an abortion in the first place.141
As states enact similar laws that regulate physician and hospital
requirements, Hellerstedt appears to sound the death knell for the
constitutional status of those laws. For example, the Virginia Board of Health
recently voted in an 11-4 decision to remove regulations on abortion
facilities.142 The Virginia regulations included provisions similar to those at
issue in Hellerstedt, such as requiring abortion providers “to meet hospitallike building standards.”143 An attorney speaking on behalf of the Virginia
Attorney General’s Office stated that in light of Hellerstedt, Virginia’s
regulations “would not likely survive a constitutional challenge.”144
Similarly, in Burns v. Cline,145 the Supreme Court in Oklahoma struck down
abortion provisions requiring strict licensing and inspection schemes for
abortion facilities.146 In a concurring opinion, Vice Chief Justice Combs
pointed to Hellerstedt’s espousal of Casey’s undue burden standard, and
conducted an undue burden analysis of the Oklahoma law, stating that the
law “create[d] an open-ended array of regulatory hurdles that subject
practitioners to harsh penalties for any potential violation” and that the law
“will make it considerably more difficult for providers to operate, and
accordingly will make it more difficult for the women of Oklahoma to
exercise their federally-recognized constitutional right to control their own
reproductive futures.”147
Finally, the most recent and relevant federal case since the Hellerstedt
decision is one from the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of

140. Id. (citation omitted) (citing Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 682
(W.D. Tex. 2014), vacated sub nom. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 833 F.3d 565 (5th Cir.
2016)).
141. Id.
142. Katie Demeria, Virginia Board of Health Votes to Remove Contested Abortion
TIMES-DISPATCH
(Oct.
24,
2016,
10:15
PM),
Regulations,
RICH.
http://www.richmond.com/news/virginia/government-politics/article_c49cb635-65d6-5b25-b344e00f48afe8cc.html; VIRGINIA STATE BOARD OF HEALTH, MEETING MINUTES 6 (Oct. 24, 2016).
143. Demeria, supra note 142.
144. Id. (quoting a statement by Cynthia Bailey with the state Attorney General’s office to the
Virginia Board of Health during a specially scheduled meeting to vote on pending abortion
regulations in the state).
145. 382 P.3d 1048 (Okla. 2016).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1057 (Combs, V.C.J., concurring).
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Alabama, West Alabama Women’s Center v. Miller,148 in which a federal
district court found that two abortion regulation provisions, a schoolproximity provision and a fetal-demise provision, imposed undue burdens on
women seeking abortions in the state.149 The court relied on Hellerstedt to
show that “imposing substantial costs on abortion providers to comply with
a statute places burdens on women’s access to abortion—regardless of the
financial circumstances of the clinics.”150 Because the Alabama law would
force two out of only five abortion clinics in the State to close, the court found
two important results making this effect an undue burden on women in
Alabama.151 First, the closure of the two clinics would eliminate a woman’s
right to choose to have an abortion after fifteen weeks of pregnancy because
those were the only clinics performing such abortions in Alabama.152
Second, the closure of the two clinics would force women in Alabama to
travel great distances to obtain pre-fifteen week abortions.153 The federal
court also made a significant commentary on the nature of the undue burden
standard: that the “analysis must have bite.”154 This case seems to suggest
that in the wake of Hellerstedt, a stricter undue burden test is at play in
abortion jurisprudence, and laws that burden abortion providers and women
through large-scale institutional regulations will not survive.
C. Policy Consequences
In states aiming to continue enforcing abortion regulations, abortion
providers and women seeking abortions will face challenging obstacles that
a potentially right-leaning Court could uphold as constitutional. While
Hellerstedt was celebrated as a “win” for women’s reproductive rights
advocates,155 the legal challenges will continue as states and courts grapple
148. No. 2:15cv497-MHT (WO) (M.D. Ala. Oct. 27, 2016), appeal filed No. 16-17296 (11th
Cir. Nov. 29, 2016).
149. Id. at 97–101. The school-proximity law prohibited the health department from issuing or
renewing licenses to abortion clinics that perform abortions located within 2,000 feet of a K-8 public
school. Id. at 15. The fetal-demise law imposed a criminal penalty on physicians who “purposely
perform ‘dismemberment abortions’” which would include the banning of the standard D&E
method “if used without first inducing fetal demise.” Id. at 60–61.
150. Id. at 35.
151. Id. at 36.
152. Id. at 36–37.
153. Id. at 38–39.
154. Id. at 49.
155. See, e.g., Samantha Allen, Supreme Court’s Texas Decision Is the Greatest Victory for
Abortion Rights Since Roe v. Wade, DAILY BEAST (June 27, 2016, 11:06 AM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/06/27/supreme-court-s-texas-decision-is-the-greatestvictory-for-abortion-rights-since-roe-v-wade.html (praising the Court’s decision); Melissa
Batchelor Warnke, Opinion, The Supreme Court Ruling Is an Abortion-Rights Victory. But It
Doesn’t Guarantee Access to Services, L.A. TIMES (June 28, 2016, 2:36 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/opinion-la/la-ol-supreme-court-abortion-texas-clinics-20160628-
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with which regulations constitute an undue burden and which regulations do
not. Planned Parenthood has filed several lawsuits in state and federal court
challenging abortion regulations in Alaska, Missouri, and North Carolina that
are markedly similar to the regulations struck down in Hellerstedt.156
Alaska’s law bans abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy, which forces
many women to travel outside the state to obtain an abortion.157 North
Carolina’s law bans abortions after the twentieth week of pregnancy and
includes a narrow health exception in extreme health emergencies.158 In
Missouri, the restrictions have closed all but one health center that provides
abortions in the state.159
Even with the dual framework discussed above,160 one can ponder the
myriad new ways in which a state may seek to regulate abortion. Even
though Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence warned about the unconstitutionality
of future “laws like H.B. 2,”161 the future of such laws are still at the mercy
of the undue burden test.
1. States Continue to Pass Restrictive Abortion Legislation Which
Tests the Boundaries of the Undue Burden Test
The Court added a new dimension to its undue burden jurisprudence
when it upheld the partial-birth abortion ban.162 The earliest application of
the undue burden test was in the Court’s review of the distinctive partial-birth
abortion ban in Stenberg v. Carhart.163 Finding the ban imposed an undue
burden on women seeking abortion, the Court struck down the law because
it lacked a life and health exception for the woman.164 With new

snap-story.html (noting that the Court’s decision was an “abortion-rights victory”); Sara
Rosenbaum, When Common Sense and Public Health Prevail: Whole Woman’s Health v.
Hellerstedt, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (July 1, 2016), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/07/01/whencommon-sense-and-public-health-prevail-whole-womens-health-v-hellerstedt/ (explaining the
Court’s decision); Mary Tuma, An Undue Burden: Supremes Vindicate Pro-Choice Texans, AUSTIN
CHRON. (July 1, 2016), http://www.austinchronicle.com/news/2016-07-01/an-undue-burdensupremes-vindicate-pro-choice-texans/ (explaining that “Texas women won a rare victory”).
156. John Kennedy, Alaska, Missouri, North Carolina Sued over Abortion Laws, LAW360 (Nov.
30, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/867414/alaska-missouri-north-carolina-sued-overabortion-laws.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See supra Part II.B.
161. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2321 (2016) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
162. 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007); see supra note 51 (describing the partial-birth abortion
procedure).
163. 530 U.S. 914 (2000); see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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appointments to the Court,165 and a new challenge to a similar partial-birth
abortion ban, the Court again applied the undue burden test in Gonzales v.
Carhart.166 The second time around, the Court upheld the partial-birth
abortion ban.167 With no discernible difference between the two statutes at
issue in Carhart and Gonzales, the Court reflected a shift in its rationale as
new Justices applied the same undue burden test in different ways. Relying
on legislative findings as to partial-birth abortion’s gruesome nature and its
potential threat to the dignity of the medical profession, the Court found that
the ban did not pose an undue burden on women, even in cases where the
health of the mother was at stake.168
Gonzales thus represents a high-water mark in the Court’s abortion
jurisprudence. While the Court found that a law requiring spousal
notification imposed an undue burden,169 it did not find an undue burden in a
law that entirely prohibited a form of abortion, even when the mother’s health
is at risk.170 Contrary to Casey’s finding that a spousal notification provision
imposed an undue burden on a woman because it potentially endangered the
life of the mother in an abusive relationship, the Gonzales Court seems to
shift its focus away from this concern. What is unique about Gonzales is the
moral and ethical problem posed by the partial-birth abortion procedure.171
The Court noted that “Congress could nonetheless conclude that the type of
abortion proscribed by the Act requires specific regulation because it
implicates additional ethical and moral concerns that justify a special
prohibition.”172 A comprehensive exploration and analysis of the ethical and
moral considerations of abortion are beyond the scope of this Comment,173
but the Court will not avoid drawing boundaries when legislative findings

165. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
166. 550 U.S. 124 (2007); see supra note 54 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
169. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
170. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 168.
171. Id. at 158.
172. Id. (emphasis added).
173. One possible explanation for the seemingly contradictory holdings of Casey and Gonzales
is the pervasive stigma against abortion. See Scott Skinner-Thompson, Sylvia A. Law & Hugh
Baran, Marriage, Abortion, and Coming Out, 116 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 126, 149–50 (2016).
As one group of commentators has surmised:
Why does Justice Kennedy, and society more broadly, seem to accept sexual minorities
but not women who avoid pregnancy? We believe that the answer lies, at least partly, in
the lack of general exposure to the importance of abortion to many women’s lives and
the well-being of their already-existing children . . . . More needs to be done . . . to help
destigmatize the right to reproductive freedom, lest that right continue to be eroded
through legislative and judicial action.
Id.
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indicate a close proximity between “practices that extinguish life” and
“actions that are condemned.”174
Likewise, some recent state laws regulating abortion shift the focus from
ensuring the health and safety of the mother to preserving the dignity of the
fetus. The Texas Department of State Health Services instituted new
requirements for the disposal of fetal remains, including prohibiting the
disposal of fetal tissue in landfills and eliminating other forms of fetal tissue
disposition to “afford protection and dignity to the unborn consistent with the
Legislature’s expression of its intent.”175 Initially drafted to go into effect by
the end of December 2016, the U.S. District Court for the Western District
of Texas delayed the implementation of the rule until January 27, 2017.176
Abortion rights groups filed suit against the State of Texas, citing Hellerstedt
as declaring “that medically unnecessary restrictions on abortion access are
unconstitutional.”177 These groups claim that requiring fetal burials or
cremations imposes a cost on abortion providers that may then be passed on
to women, and further, that such requirements serve no health benefit.178 The
Texas Attorney General issued a statement that he is confident that the court
will rule for the state as “Texas values the dignity of the remains of the unborn
and believes that fetal tissue should be disposed of properly and
humanely.”179
Without a court opinion on the validity of these laws, one can only
hypothesize whether they constitute an undue burden or not. What remains
clear is that the undue burden standard is the applicable standard, and if a law
can be fashioned that does not create a substantial obstacle to a woman
seeking an abortion, then it should be constitutional.180 If the fetal burial laws

174. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 158 (comparing the Court’s jurisprudence on abortion with its
jurisprudence on end-of-life decisions in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 732–35 (1997)).
175. Definition, Treatment, and Disposition of Special Waste from Health Care-Related
Facilities, 41 Tex. Reg. 9709 (Dec. 9, 2016).
176. Marissa Evans, Judge Delays Texas’ Fetal Remains Rule Until Jan. 6, TEXAS TRIB. (Dec.
15, 2016, 3:28 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2016/12/15/federal-judge-delays-texas-fetalremains-rule-unti/; Akira Tomlinson, Federal Judge Extends Order Blocking Texas Fetal Burial
Rule, JURIST (Jan. 5, 2017, 4:16 PM), http://www.jurist.org/paperchase/2017/01/federal-judgeextends-order-blocking-texas-fetal-burial-rule.php.
177. Jennifer Ludden, Lawsuit Challenges Fetal Burial Rule in Texas, NPR (Dec. 12, 2016,
5:52 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/12/12/505304688/lawsuit-challengesfetal-burial-rule-in-texas (quoting Nancy Northrup, president and CEO of the Center for
Reproductive Rights, an abortion rights groups).
178. Id.
179. Tomlinson, supra note 176 (quoting Press Release, Attorney Gen. of Tex., AG Paxton
Releases Statement on Fetal Remains Disposition Hearing (Jan. 4, 2017),
https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/releases/ag-paxton-releases-statement-on-fetalremains-disposition-hearing).
180. See supra notes 121–134 and accompanying text.
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do not impose such an extraordinary cost on abortion providers that they will
need to close their clinics, then these laws may be upheld.
2. Abortion Providers’ Ability to Stay Open Statewide Will Be
Integral to Determining Whether an Abortion Regulation
Imposes an Undue Burden
As Hellerstedt shows, the Court has not pinpointed a statistical threshold
for when a regulation creates an undue burden. But, the Court will take
seriously those statistics that reflect abortion clinic closures statewide and a
drastic increase in travel times to clinics—for example, if a woman would
need to travel to another state. When an abortion regulation forces a clinic
closure, the regulation entirely removes a place that a woman could go to get
an abortion. Therefore, the Court has considered forced closure to be the
greatest burden. As states fashion innovative abortion regulations,181
abortion providers may have the ability to anticipate and plan for such
restrictions. Consequently, providers would be unable to argue that the laws
will force them to close down, and thus these new laws may not meet the
undue burden standard as applied in Hellerstedt. This situation “traps”
abortion providers, for if they can meet the regulations, even at the risk of
treating a smaller number of women, then some individual women will face
greater obstacles in securing an abortion. If the providers can meet the
regulations, but decide not to in order to meet as much of the demand for the
procedure as possible, the providers may lose any constitutional basis for
challenging the regulations.
An instructive example of this issue is the Ohio Department of Health’s
closure of the only remaining abortion clinic in Dayton in November 2016
because the clinic failed to obtain a required transfer agreement with a nearby
hospital in cases of emergency.182 While the lawyer for the clinic is
“confident” that the clinic will remain open during an appeal of the
Department of Health’s decision, the closure of this facility would bring the
total number of abortion providers in the state to eight, of which several are
already involved in legal fights to remain open.183 The regulations at issue

181. Missouri passed a measure that would create a ballot initiative on abortion that would
“establish fetal person, and thereby ban abortion.” State Policy Updates: Major Developments in
Sexual and Reproductive Health, GUTTMACHER INST., https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy
(last updated Dec. 31, 2016). Ohio’s Senate passed a measure that would require abortion tissue to
be cremated or interred. Id. Utah’s governor Gary Herbert signed a bill requiring fetal anesthesia
during abortions at or after twenty weeks of pregnancy, which may require increased anesthesia for
the woman as well. Id.
182. Katie Wedell, Dayton Area’s Only Abortion Clinic Ordered to Shut Down, DAYTON DAILY
NEWS (Dec. 1, 2016, 11:20 AM), http://www.daytondailynews.com/news/local/dayton-area-onlyabortion-clinic-ordered-shut-down/9kMF5bJn9cPFyIOao2VbHK/.
183. Id.
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resemble Texas’ H.B. 2 in that they require abortion clinics to have
“emergency backup agreements with nearby hospitals,” and specific
physicians listed as able and willing to perform the abortions.184 The Dayton
abortion clinic has been unable to fulfill this requirement since 2002, because
many physicians are targeted or harassed by anti-abortion activists if their
names are publicized as part of the emergency backup agreement.185 Ohio’s
State Representative Greta Johnson doubted the regulation’s ability to
withstand legal scrutiny in light of the Hellerstedt decision.186 The closure
of the last remaining Dayton abortion clinic is significant because the burden
posed by this closure is indicative of finding the same undue burden found in
Hellerstedt.
3. The Future of the Abortion Right Under the Trump Administration
May Be Upended by a Review of the Undue Burden Test and
Abortion Jurisprudence
The Trump administration may upend the undue burden jurisprudence
entirely and usher in a new era of abortion regulations, which would return
abortion regulation to the states.187 Then President-elect Trump stated, in a
60 Minutes interview in December 2016, that the abortion right is not settled
whereas the same-sex marriage law is.188 With his ability to appoint only one
Justice at this time, however, whom he has noted “will be pro-life,”189
President Trump will be limited by the Court’s complicated abortion
framework and its consistent, albeit somewhat fragmented, protection of a
woman’s right to choose. For example, President Trump indicated that a
woman might have to go to another state to get an abortion if she cannot get

184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. (quoting State Rep. Greta Johnson); Press Release, Ohio House of Representatives
132nd General Assembly, State Stands on Shaky Legal Ground to Shutter Women’s Health Clinic
(Dec. 1, 2016), http://www.ohiohouse.gov/greta-johnson/press/state-stands-on-shaky-legalground-to-shutter-womens-health-clinic (“[T]he state of Ohio [is] acting on likely-unconstitutional
laws . . . jeopardizing the health and safety of Ohio women for political gain.” (quoting Rep. Greta
Johnson)).
187. See S.M., How States, Emboldened by Trump, Are Challenging Abortion Rights,
ECONOMIST (Dec. 13, 2016, 3:31 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/
2016/12/roe-rows (highlighting how several states may challenge abortion rights under the Trump
administration).
188. S.M., Donald Trump Says the Law Is Settled on Gay Marriage but Not on Abortion,
ECONOMIST (Nov. 15, 2016, 11:19 AM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/
2016/11/president-elect-and-supreme-court?zid=318&ah=ac379c09c1c3fb67e0e8fd1964d5247f;
Emily Schultheis, Trump Talks to “60 Minutes” About Same-Sex Marriage, Abortion and the
Supreme Court, CBS NEWS (Nov. 13, 2016, 6:58 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/trumppromises-pro-life-justices-supreme-court-same-sex-marriage/.
189. S.M., supra note 188.

2017]

A CHILL WIND BLOWS

815

one in her own state.190 With the appointment of Judge Neil Gorsuch to the
Supreme Court, President Trump has tapped a Justice that is known for his
conservative jurisprudence on religion, physician-assisted suicide, and the
“right” to die.191 For example, in Judge Gorsuch’s 2006 book on physicianassisted suicide, he “outline[s] the moral, legal, and logistical challenges that
emerge at the end of life.”192 Gorsuch’s position on the Tenth Circuit in the
Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius193 case further highlights the role that religion may
play in his future Supreme Court jurisprudence.194
President Trump has noted that the abortion debate “has a long, long
way to go.”195 Hellerstedt’s decision shows just how long, because the Court
found that women resorting to out of state abortions constituted an undue
burden and were thus unconstitutional.196 To get around this impediment,
future appointees to the Court, including Judge Gorsuch, will likely follow
Justice Alito’s statistical approach197 in which he looked at the small fraction
of all women of reproductive age whom the regulations affect, rather than the
much larger fraction of women seeking abortion whom the regulations
affect.198 Either way, the future of the undue burden test may rely on the
Justices’ views on which statistics govern the analysis.
III. CONCLUSION
Although a woman no longer has a fundamental right to abortion,199
Supreme Court abortion jurisprudence has reflected a steady commitment to
protecting a woman’s right to choose whether to have an abortion in the early
stages of pregnancy.200 This choice, however, does not come without a cost

190. Id.
191. See Emma Green, Trump Picks a Bioethicist for the Supreme Court, ATLANTIC (Feb. 1,
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/trump-bioethics-supreme-court/5152
50/ (noting Judge Gorsuch’s interest in “matters of life and death”).
192. Id. (citing NEIL GORSUCH, THE FUTURE OF ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA (2006)).
193. 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013); see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014)
(holding that closely held for-profit companies may be exempt from a regulation imposing
mandatory insurance coverage for contraceptive care based on religious objections).
194. Green, supra note 191 (“His most lasting legacy from his time on the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals is likely Hobby Lobby vs. Sebelius, a case about religious objections to the rules on birthcontrol coverage in the Affordable Care Act, which later became a landmark Supreme Court
decision.”).
195. S.M., supra note 188.
196. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
197. Id. at 2330 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting).
198. Id.; see also Neil S. Siegel, The Distinctive Role of Justice Alito: From a Politics of
Restoration to a Politics of Dissent, 126 YALE L.J. F. 164, 166 (2016) (discussing Justice Alito’s
methodology and jurisprudence).
199. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
200. See supra Part I.B.

816

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 76:792

nor without significant conditions to both women and abortion providers.201
The undue burden test guides policymakers to fashion laws that do not place
a substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking abortion.202 The dual
framework analysis suggested in this Comment cannot encompass every
possible abortion regulation that may fit neatly into one of the two categories,
either individually based regulations or institutionally based regulations. As
Gonzales shows, certain unique situations, such as the partial-birth abortion
procedure, reflect the Court’s commitment to protecting the state’s interest in
protecting the life of a fetus.203
In the wake of Hellerstedt, abortion providers had cause to celebrate,204
as many clinics remained open and no longer had to meet restrictive
regulations.205 The Court’s application of the undue burden test reflects a
rejection of “TRAP” laws, and the consequent legal battles over laws like
Texas H.B. 2 further reflect judicial disapproval of these laws.206
Nevertheless, restrictive regulations of abortion are increasing.207 Rather
than enacting laws that impose significant restrictions which often lead to
automatic closures of abortion providers,208 states are fashioning laws that
are not as strict, and do not produce as drastic an effect on abortion
providers.209 The laws, however, place a burden on abortion providers by
imposing a hard choice between serving much fewer women or closing.210
Unless clinics are forced to close in a clear and sweeping fashion, as often
results from regulations aimed at the institutional and foundational aspects of
the clinics,211 the undue burden standard may not offer much relief.

201. See supra Part II.C.
202. See supra Part I.A.3
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